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Aren’t they scared? 
The VIX, or Volatility Index, is Wall Street’s fear gauge. I first started paying attention to it in 
the late 1990s. Back then, a level of around 20 seemed normal. If the VIX got to 30, that 
indicated serious market unease. Over 40 signalled a crisis. The highest the VIX ever got was 
during the 1987 stockmarket crash, when it reached 150. In the 2008 global banking crisis, 
the VIX peaked at just under 90.  
 With a prolonged stockmarket boom (fuelled initially by the Federal Reserve flooding 
the markets with cheap money) showing signs of exhaustion, with the US political system 
polarised – even paralysed – and with a President who is the very opposite of calm, you 
might expect the VIX to be at least in the sweaty-palmed 30s. It isn’t. As this issue of the LRB 
went to press, the VIX was 12.35 [update]. It’s been low for many months, and shows no 
clear sign of increasing.  
 Donald Trump is proud of the rise of US share prices since his election, and would no 
doubt attribute the fear gauge’s low readings to investors’ confidence in his leadership. But, 
as we Scots put it, I hae me doobts, and there’s indeed another explanation. Whenever you 
measure something, you alter it: that, after all, is what Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is 
often taken to mean. In the everyday material world, you can usually set this aside: I don’t 
worry about the effect of my speedometer on how fast my car’s wheels turn or on how its 
engine runs. You can’t ignore it, however, in economic life. As the economist Charles 
Goodhart argues, if a measurement device is widely used, it stops being a simple economic 
speedometer. In the financial markets, it becomes part of how traders think, and can begin 
to affect their actions deeply.  
 The VIX involves two iterations of this process. The first began in 1973, when the 
world’s first organised options exchange was set up in Chicago, and when a hugely 
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influential mathematical model of options prices was published by the economists Fischer 
Black, Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton. An option gives its holder a right, but not an 
obligation. A ‘put option’, for example, is the right to sell an asset such as a block of shares 
at a pre-set price on, or up to, the date on which the option expires. A ‘put’ can thus 
function as a kind of insurance, limiting the losses that the owner of the asset can suffer.  
 A right of that kind is clearly valuable, but it’s far from obvious how to measure an 
option’s value. Making simplifying assumptions of the kind common in economics, Black, 
Scholes and Merton found an elegant way of doing just that. Their options model quickly 
stopped being just academic economics: options traders started to use it in Chicago’s 
crowded trading pits. In so doing, they changed patterns of options prices (which originally 
corresponded only roughly to the postulates of Black and his colleagues), making those 
patterns a much closer fit to the model. Timothy Mitchell of New York University elegantly 
summarises the generic process: ‘The effectiveness of economics rests on what it does, not 
on what it says’.1  
 The process’s second iteration also involved economists, at least initially. The crucial 
parameter in the Black-Scholes-Merton options model is the volatility of the underlying 
shares: the extent of the fluctuations of their price. One of the simplifying assumptions 
made by the model’s authors was that the volatility of any given stock was constant, but 
traders could not bring themselves to believe that. Nor did Fischer Black or any other 
economist take that assumption literally. Both practitioners and economists realised, 
however, that you could use the options model backwards, so to speak: you could start with 
                                                     
1 Donald MacKenzie first wrote about these performative effects of economics in the LRBs 
of 13 April 2000 and 31 October 2002. 
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the market price of an option, and calculate the level of volatility of the underlying shares 
that was consistent with that price.  
 You therefore didn’t need to run a public opinion poll to find out market 
practitioners’ expectations about the volatility of share prices: you could infer those 
expectations from the prices of options. In the mid 1980s, the economists Menachem 
Brenner and Dan Galai started to lobby the US options exchanges to create a ‘volatility 
index’, based on options prices, that would measure stockmarket volatility in a way loosely 
analogous to – albeit mathematically far more sophisticated than – how the Dow Jones 
average or the Standard & Poor’s 500 index summarises the market’s overall level. By the 
early 1990s, the CBOE (the Chicago Board Options Exchange) was convinced, and it 
commissioned economist Robert Whaley to devise the best way of constructing a volatility 
index covering the ensemble of the stocks that make up the S&P 500 index.  
 The exact way in which the VIX – the CBOE Volatility Index – is calculated has 
changed through time, and its values have also been worked out retrospectively for the 
second half of the 1980s. (There’s no simple way of saying exactly what a given level of the 
VIX means. Perhaps you remember from secondary school how a ‘standard deviation’ 
measures the amount by which, in aggregate, a characteristic such as people’s height varies 
from its average. The VIX is a sort of standard deviation, modified for the particularities of 
finance, and conceived of as measuring the variability of a single object – a price – that 
changes continually as time passes.) What matters, however, from my viewpoint is that the 
VIX did indeed begin as a gauge, as a measurement device: it was not intended to affect 
how options or shares were traded, and initially does not seem to have done so to any great 
extent. It was never literally a gauge of fear, because the volatility of a price includes its 
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upward as well as its downward movements. But traders have always looked to the VIX 
primarily as a guide to the extent to which investors in the aggregate fear major price falls.  
 The fear gauge started to become an intrinsic part of finance’s engine in 2004, when 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange began to turn the VIX from a measure of volatility into 
something you could actually trade. The CBOE did so by introducing futures contracts on the 
VIX, which allow traders to bet on or hedge themselves against coming rises or falls in the 
VIX’s level. Those contracts, and the CBOE Futures Exchange on which they trade, are the 
pretty much exclusive domain of professional traders. In 2009-10, however, ‘exchange 
traded funds’ (ETFs) linked to the VIX were introduced. These ETFs are not futures contracts 
but shares that track the VIX, and they are easily accessible to amateur traders, although 
also widely used by professionals. The best known of the ETFs is the VXX, which the 
Financial Times reports to have been the fifth most heavily traded stock in the US in 2016. If 
the VXX isn’t racy enough for you, there’s also the UVXY, ranked number ten by trading 
volume. Buying the UVXY is the equivalent of trading the VIX using not just your own savings 
but also borrowed money. 
 The most interesting of all these ETFs is the one that traders know by its ticker 
symbol as the XIV. It’s got nothing to do with the number 14. The XIV is an ‘inverse’ ETF: 
buying the XIV is the equivalent of betting that volatility, as measured by the VIX, is going to 
continue to fall. By last April, the apparently utterly esoteric XIV had reached 34th in the 
ranking of US shares by trading volume, surpassing (as the FT noted) blue-chip corporations 
such as Chevron and Pfizer. It’s not surprising that the XIV has been so successful. Buying 
the XIV is the most straightforward way for an amateur trader to bet that the VIX will fall, 
and, as the FT puts it, that bet ‘has trounced the returns of pretty much everything since the 
[banking] crisis’. Five years ago, you could still buy a unit of the XIV for less than $20. This 
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November, you could have sold that unit for nearly $110, a return on your money of nearly 
500 percent. (For the first time, the pages of the LRB here need a standard disclaimer: 
neither the author nor the LRB offers financial advice. Consult a qualified professional!) 
 The ‘short VIX’ trade is professionals’ term for the wager, made in recent years on a 
massive scale, that the VIX will go on falling. There are, of course, two parties to every trade, 
and the short VIX is no exception. The professional trading firms that accommodate the 
giant bet on a falling VIX have to trade in such a way that they don’t lose money if the 
punters are right; so far, they usually have been right. The firms do that by entering into 
offsetting trades, which usually take the form – directly or indirectly – of trades on the CBOE 
in the options whose prices inform the calculation of the VIX. These trades increase the 
supply of these options, helping keep their prices, and thus the VIX, low. There’s a feedback 
loop involved, and it seems to have been operating on an industrial scale: so far, quite 
sufficient to keep the fear gauge seemingly stuck at the bottom of the scale, no matter what 
the antics of the occupant of the White House.  
 Although many people in the markets also suspect that a loop of this kind explains 
why the VIX remains low, I can’t be entirely sure. Things like this typically become clear only 
in retrospect, and sometimes not even then. I can’t even decide whether I am more worried 
by the ‘loop’ explanation being right or by it being wrong. If it’s right, the danger comes 
from the fact that finance’s feedback loops can suddenly fling themselves violently into 
reverse, and this can cause severe whiplash. That, for instance, was almost certainly an 
important element in the 1987 crash. Market participants employing ‘portfolio insurance’, 
an automatic hedging strategy based on the Black-Scholes-Merton model, needed quickly to 
sell large numbers of S&P 500 futures contracts, and that selling pressure fed through into 
the underlying stockmarket, exacerbating an already fragile mood and helping cause a fall of 
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around a fifth in a single day – the worst single day ever in the history of share trading in the 
US.2 If all those market participants, amateur and professional, who are betting on the VIX 
remaining low were suddenly to change their minds and to try simultaneously to liquidate 
their positions, a disruption on this scale can’t be ruled out.  
 Perhaps those betting on a low level of the VIX are aware of the feedback loop, and 
know that the loop could suddenly go into reverse: in other words, they are consciously 
taking a substantial risk in trying to squeeze the final few dollars out of the best trade of the 
last five years. But maybe they don’t see themselves as taking a big risk, and perhaps the 
loop isn’t the explanation of the fear gauge’s low readings. Maybe investors in the US simply 
aren’t frightened. That would be worrying in quite a different way. It reminds me too much 
of the widespread feeling, in the run up to the global banking crisis, that markets were 
enjoying a durable ‘great moderation’, free of boom and bust, bubbles and crashes. The 
time the rest of us should get scared is precisely when market participants aren’t.  
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2 The 1987 crash was described by MacKenzie in the LRB of 4 August 2005. 
